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Rejoinder to Parr on Evictionism and Departurism

ABSTRACT: This present paper is part four in a debate Sean Parr and I are having on abortion. Part one consisted of Parr, 2011. Part two consisted of Block, 2011A. Part three consisted of Parr, 2013. In my view, the proper libertarian position on abortion is neither pro-life nor pro-choice. Rather, 'evictionism', where the mother of a fetus has a right to evict it from her womb, in the gentlest manner possible (that is, to preserve its life during the process of eviction if at all possible), but not to kill it. As I see matters, Parr (2011, 2013) interprets "in the gentlest manner possible" so radically as to claim that the fetus may only be evicted if it is viable outside the womb; that is to say, he maintains that libertarianism is consistent, only, with the pro-life position. My claim is that this constitutes a radical misconstrual of libertarianism.

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INTRODUCTION

I first offered the evictionist solution to the pro-life versus pro-choice quandary over abortion in Block (1977). When I did so I expected that libertarians would welcome this initiative with great enthusiasm and that non-libertarians would scorn and reject it. I was wrong on both counts. I expected support from libertarians because the evictionist theory is totally predicated upon private property right, one of the two basic building blocks of our shared philosophy.[1] Also, I thought, this idea would really put us libertarians on the political philosophy map; we would no longer be ignored, marginalized. After all, the pro-life pro-choice controversy is perhaps the most highly charged philosophical debate ever to have fascinated not only the general public, but the intelligentsia as well.

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1 The other is the non-aggression principle, or NAP. See on this Rothbard, 1973, 1998; Hoppe, 1993.

Unlike other divisive issues,[2] each side must concede that the other has at least one valid point. No pro choicer can be fully comfortable in his heart of hearts in seeing the massive number of deaths of even potential human beings, as they view the unborn child. No pro-lifer can be completely happy about forcing the victim of rape to a further nine months of suffering. If we libertarians could show a way out of this quandary, while sticking to our principles, this, I expected, might well be the vehicle to capture the positive attention and the loyalty of the public to our banner. In the event I was sorely disappointed. Every libertarian who wrote about evictionism, at least those who published in refereed journals such as this one, vehemently rejected it, and no libertarian published any defense of it in such format. As to the general public, and the non-libertarian academicians, they ignored it entirely.[3]

What is evictionism? Very quickly, it posits that human life begins with the fertilized egg, not nine months later at birth. One point for the pro-lifers. But what of the property under dispute between the mother, who does not want, for *any* reason, or no reason at all, to carry the fetus in *her* womb for the full gestation period of three quarters of a year, and the human baby whose life is in dire danger if she has her way, and who wishes4 to remain exactly where he is for the full duration? Why, clearly, it belongs to the mother, and entirely so. The womb consists of parts of her very body. One point for the pro-choicers. Who has a right to control property in the libertarian view? Why, its *owner* of course; that is precisely who. The unwanted fetus is thus akin to a trespasser for the mother who wishes him not to occupy that or indeed any part of her body. Do property owners have the right to kill trespassers, such as unconscious people, or babies, who lack *mens rea*? Of course not. Must the homeowner allow the trespasser, however innocent to remain in her domicile for as long as the latter need to do so to preserve his life? No, certainly not either. Therefore, the proprietor of the property in question5 may evict, but not kill the stowaway. He must remove him in the gentlest manner possible consistent with retaining *full* rights over his own property, lest he, too, engage in an act incompatible with libertarian law.

With this introduction, we are now ready to respond to the critique of evictionism offered by Parr (2013). That is the burden of section I. Section II continues this process, following the organization of Parr's (2013) paper. We conclude in section III.

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2 E.g., guns, war, welfare state, foreign policy, education, etc.

3 The non or pseudo libertarian Jonas even refused point blank to discuss it, after first raising the issue of libertarianism and abortion himself. See on this Block, 2013A, 2013B.

4 As expressed by his champions, the pro-lifers.

5 Whatever kind of property it is: house, car, boat, plane, land, and, also, womb.

I. GENERAL RESPONSE TO PARR

My critic starts out on the wrong foot as early in his paper as the abstract. Parr (2013) states: "It will make the departurist case that allowing for the unwanted fetus to continue and complete its departure from its mother's womb is a manner gentler than would be its eviction from there and, as a result of this, that the departurist view corresponds to libertarian legal theory in a way that the evictionist one does not." But to say this is to elevate "gentleness" to a basic premise of libertarianism.[6] To do that is to very seriously misconstrue this philosophy. Libertarianism is based, rather, on the non-aggression principle (NAP) coupled with private property rights based initially on homesteading. The only time "gentleness" becomes an issue is when it comes to the question of how to deal with criminals, trespassers. The libertarian philosophy provides that such a person[7] not be harmed any more than is necessary,[8] while still fully protecting the rights of the property owner.

Parr (2013) gets this right when he quotes me (Block, 2010, footnote omitted): "Gentleness, the 'basic axiom of libertarianism [that] non-criminals are to be treated in the gentlest manner possible [consistent with stopping their aggression],' has been placed into law 'so as to preclude the victim from acting so strongly against the perpetrator that the victim, too, violates the libertarian code.'" But he fails to emphasize here, the all-important proviso I mention: "consistent with stopping their aggression." Without that stipulation, the backbone of libertarian law is destroyed.

It is gratifying that Parr and I should achieve such a great degree of agreement. Both of us "acknowledge the personhood of the fetus and make the case that the occupation of a fetus in its mother's womb is to be viewed as a trespass (and the fetus, a trespasser)." Yet it is disappointing that we reach such incompatible and logically inconsistent conclusions from these shard premises. According to my libertarian colleague: "this fetus is to be treated by the mother in 'the gentlest manner possible, for the trespasser in this case is certainly not guilty of mens rea.'" Of course, this baby human being lacks mens rea, and thus cannot be considered a criminal. However, he is nonetheless violating the libertarian legal code, which forbids anyone, for any reason, from trespassing on, occupying against the will of the owner, another person's property. It cannot be denied that the fetus is totally devoid of any intention to trespass. But the same can be said for the unconscious adult, who is unknowingly stowed away on someone else's

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6 A philosophy that Parr and I both share, presumably.

7 On libertarian punishment theory, see Block, 2009A, 2009B, Kinsella, 1996, 1997; Olson, 1979; Rothbard, 1977, 1998; Whitehead and Block, 2003.

8 Better said, any more than is compatible with libertarianism, lest such an act violate the rights of the criminal.

airplane or boat. Innocence must not be allowed to prevail over private property rights, at least not for the libertarian.

Let us consider the logical implications of this statement of Parr's (2013, footnote omitted): "The departurist view argues that if, once a property owner has deemed a non-criminal occupying his premises a trespasser, "a respect for the owner's private property rights" is demonstrated (e.g., the process of the trespasser's departure initiates or else continues), then this trespasser's continued and completed departure, rather than his death-necessitating eviction at the hands of the property owner, is to be allowed for—as this (and this alone) is what, in this instance, constitutes the gentlest manner possible."

One problem is that I do not at all consider the fetus as a non-criminal *in effect.* Totally without any mens rea, he is still occupying territory owned by another person, his mother, against the will of the latter. If that is not (ok, non) criminal trespass, then nothing is. Second, Parr does not confront Thomson's (1971, 1986, 1990, 1991) case of the two people, A and B, hooked up to the kidney of only one of them, A. B, in this scenario is also totally innocent — of mens rea, but not of trespass, a distinction not sufficiently recognized by Parr. Suppose that severing A from B will spell the death knell for the latter; the only way A can free herself from the unwanted company of B is to undertake a process that will take B's life. Parr would have none of that because this is hardly "gentle." That means this author would condemn equally innocent A to a lifetime of intimate connection to B, against her will.[9] And this in the name of libertarianism? Third, Parr again allows the tail of "gentlest manner possible" to wag the dog of libertarian's most basic premises, the NAP and the sanctity of private property rights.

Fourth, let us stipulate, arguendo, that "gentleness" is more important to libertarianism than what I have characterized as its two "basic premises." What, then, about "gentleness" for A in the Thompson case, or the mother, in the issue dividing me and Parr? "Gentleness" for the fetus constitutes the exact opposite for the mother, and, of course, vice versa. It would appear that there is not enough "gentleness" to go around. Another axiom of libertarianism is that rights *cannot* clash. If this appears to be the case as it does here at least on the basis of Parr's analysis, then one or the other or both of these so-called property rights is mis-specified. So in Parr's "gentleness" interpretation of libertarianism, who should be given this benefit? Who should prevail? Parr takes the side of the fetus, not the mother, but that is because, presumably, he looks through his "gentleness" spectacles, not his libertarian ones, and sees only the baby. But on what basis does he award all the "gentleness" to the mother? Perhaps because it will only entail nine months of suffering on her part, as against the baby's very life. On what basis would Parr, presumably, award all the "gentleness" to B, the trespasser on A's kidney in Thompson's example? Again, this might be expected since

9 She, too, lacks any mens rea.

he is weighing up B's very survival against A's great inconvenience. But this does not sound like libertarianism at all. Rather, it smacks of utilitarianism, complete with interpersonal comparisons of utility, or perhaps, Coaseanism (1960), or, maybe, egalitarianism. But not libertarianism.

Fifth, suppose it is a choice between the mother's and the babies' life. Evictionist theory is clear on this, the mother may evict, but not abort, the fetus at any time during her pregnancy, entirely at her own discretion. What is the analysis of "departurism" on this crucial issue? Parr does not say, let alone give any criterion on the basis of which we can weigh the "gentleness" due to the mother and the fetus. However, reading in between the lines, I surmise that this author would favor the baby of the parent. She, posit, is 30 years old, with a life expectancy of say only 60 more years; he in contrast, has not yet been born. If his life expectancy is also 9 decades, it is 50% longer than his mother's. Thus, I think, Parr's nod goes to the latter. But this is an exercise in "gentleness," or Coaseanism, or utilitarianism. It has nothing at all to do with a rights-based libertarianism.

II. CRITIQUE CONTINUED

I now comment on each of the premise headings of the Parr paper.

A. Gentleness

Parr (2013) accuses me of making an error, akin to saying "'I'm all for monogamous relationships. Provided, only, that either member of them is free to date other people.' Such would be defining monogamy in a way that absolutely precludes a relationship with only one person at a time. In like manner, Block attempts to preempt departurism from the jump by insisting that the only licit gentleness is the one that allows for the total effacement of the distinction between criminal and non-criminal aggressors. Block's view is well understood. He never supports the gentlest manner possible, a derivative of the non-aggression principle (NAP)…"

Parr would indeed have a good point if I did indeed buy into the notion that the essence of libertarianism is "gentleness," not the NAP based on licit property rights, and that "gentleness" applies only to the baby, not to the owner of the womb. I do not. This author admits that "gestation constitutes a process that works to affect the cessation of property-directed aggression," in nine months, but his entire analysis is incompatible with that concession.

Let us consider this sharp rebuke that Parr (2013, footnote deleted) delivers against the evictionist theory:

> …to Block, the non-criminal perpetrator is due gentleness, sure, but 'provided, only, that the rights (sic) of the property owner to evict trespassers is

> upheld'. This is something like saying, 'I'm all for monogamous relationships. Provided, only, that either member of them is free to date other people'. Such would be defining monogamy in a way that absolutely precludes a relationship with only one person at a time. In like manner, Block attempts to preempt departurism from the jump by insisting that the only licit gentleness is the one that allows for the total effacement of the distinction between criminal and non-criminal aggressors.

To define "monogamy" so as to include liaisons is to commit a logical contradiction, equivalent to "square circle" or "married bachelor." Have I committed so blatant a fallacy? Methinks not. Parr is arguing in effect that what I give with one hand (gentleness) I take away with the other (the right of the mother to evict a trespasser who bears no mens rea). That is to say, there is no difference between the evictionist position and that of pro-choice. The "gentleness" of neither of them does the fetus one single bit of good. Parr could not be more in error in this contention of this. There is a *world* of difference between the two — for babies in the third trimester at present, and, for all babies as medical technology continually improves. Right now, at one fell swoop, if evictionism were to replace our present pro-life legislation, not a single solitary young human being in the seventh through ninth month of his pre-birth life would be allowed to be purposefully killed. Is that not pretty "gentle" compared to present practices? It is more than passing curious that Parr would be unaware of this crucially important distinction. This is the "total effacement of the distinction between criminal and non-criminal aggressors?" The criminal trespassers, in my analysis of libertarian law, may be dealt with harshly if they resist being removed from the premises they are unjustly occupying. The non-criminal ones, in very sharp contrast indeed, the fetuses at present in their third trimester and all of them, eventually, must be handled very differently. Their lives must be preserved. They must be placed in the tender hands of adoptive parents. That is not at all the total effacement of this distinction, Parr to the contrary notwithstanding.

B. Unintentional action

Of course the fetus cannot actively, purposefully, consciously, commit a trespass. But he can *passively* do so. The same applies to the adults person who is drugged unconscious and then stowed away on a boat or plane, or attached to someone else's kidney. Of course the fetus and such an unconscious adult person cannot "refuse" or agree, for that matter, to depart from someone else's property. But he can fail to do so. If he does, he is in violation of libertarian (not "gentleness") law. It is thus justified for the rightful owner or his or her agents to act so as to defend their property.

I agree with Parr (2013) that "gestation constitutes a process that works to affect the cessation of property-directed aggression," but I do not see the relevance. This process takes nine months. Why should the owner's property rights be held in abeyance for that period of time? Why should Thompson's owner of the kidney be compelled to allow her (entirely innocent) trespasser to stay connected to her for nine months or for any other lengthy period of time, if that is what it takes to preserve the life of the latter?

My debating partner is very exercised that I have attempted to kick him in "the crotch," as he so eloquently puts matters. This stems, I fear, from an admitted "terminological error on the part of the author," that is, Parr, in claiming that fetuses can engage in human action. Of course, they cannot. I am glad that Parr and I are now in accord on this matter.

C. Rape

In this section Parr (2013) attempts to refute my reductio against his position. I (Block, 2010) claimed that employing Parr's logic, the rapist should be able to garner from the cops "a little time to finish up" if we take "departurism" seriously. Parr rejects this criticism on the ground that the rapist is a criminal and the fetus is not. Of course, the latter never has mens rea, while this does not at all apply to the former. However, it is possible to concoct a case where this does not hold true. Suppose an ordinary man, a non-rapist, is drugged or hypnotized into engaging in this sort of evil attack on a woman.[10] Then, this "rapist" would lack mens rea, just like the baby. If this is the case, then according to "departurism," he would indeed be entitled to "just a little more time" to complete his despicable[11] act, provided, only, that to not allow him to do so might injure him, negatively impact his health, very seriously, even leading to his death. Hey, we are concocting a weird example, we might as well go all the way. We stipulate that if the hypnotized rapist does not fulfill his orders to completion, to ejaculation, he will die. The "departurist," if he consistently cleaves to his misbegotten views, would have to urge "gentleness" for the rapist. Perhaps, even, if this were physically possible, to allow him to continue his rape of this unfortunate woman for a full nine months. We now assume that rape, not only gestation requires "time to finish up." "Gentleness" uber alles, after all, for Parr's notion of libertarianism. "Gentleness" for the drugged or hypnotized, and hence non criminal rapist; just not for his victim.

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10 I have no idea of whether this is medically or physiologically or biologically possible. Work with me here.

11 Albeit not intentional.

When it is the mother's life at stake versus that of the baby's, Parr's analysis is faulty. Parr bases it on the distinction between aggression against the person on the one hand and violence against mere property on the other. But this will not do. First, in this case it is person versus person. The mother's person hangs in the balance not against the baby's physical property, but against his person, too. And vice versa of course. Secondly, this is a spurious distinction, at least for libertarianism, properly understood. Property is property is property, whether it is physical, inanimate, or human. Murder is a violation of property rights in the person, as is rape. Most of the time, violations against property rights in the person are more important than those which attack non-person property rights. But not always. For example, a minor assault and battery against the person, which leaves him pretty much as he was before, is far less serious than stealing his horse, or his food, or his water, which leads to his death (in the old western deserts). Third, Parr's argument is akin, not to say indistinguishable from, the leftist criticism of markets: "Persons before property rights." But who is it thought that retains the property rights in inanimate matter? Why, it is human beings.[12]

D. Positive obligations

Here, Parr attempts to deflect the charge that "departurism" does not imply positive obligations. He is entirely correct in this claim if and only if "gentleness is a libertarian fundamental." But as it is not at all fundamental to libertarianism but rather peripheral to it at best, Parr's defense fails.[13] To force an unwilling woman, a rape victim, to undergo additional exquisite torture for the sake of an innocent (drugged or hypnotized) rapist cannot possibly be a negative obligation of hers. Rather, to do so would be a positive obligation, to come to the aid of, to be a good Samaritan to, a person to whom she owes nothing, the non mens rea rapist. Note, I chose a rather sympathetic rapist here, one who does so unintentionally. But the baby who results from rape, of whatever type, kind or variety, is equal to any other fetus in terms of "gentleness" owed to it. That baby, just like every other, is a trespasser, as in the case of all fetuses residing inside the private property of an unwilling mother.

In this section of his paper Parr (2013, footnote deleted) also addresses the issue of why I think the obligation to "'notify the orphanage, church, monastery, etc., of an (sic) no longer-wanted infant' is not, in Block's view, a positive obligation." Parr attributes this, falsely, to my views on the abandonment of physical

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12 This is similar that that old refrain in urban planning: "People before cars." One wonders who advocates of this refrain think is driving those automobiles? Elephants? Copper wires, maybe?

13 "Gentleness" merely ensures that victims do not punish criminals more severely than libertarian punishment theory allows.

property.[14] Rather, this view of mine stems from homesteading property, not abandoning it. My claim is that land cannot be homesteaded in a manner that shuts off virgin land to the activities of other people, as in the form of a bagel or donut with a hole in the middle of it (Block, 2008). This is entirely a different matter than the one attributed to me by Parr (2013). The point is, the hole in the bagel is analogous to the unwanted child. In each case, the owner is precluding others from homesteading either the land or the child, by homesteading land in that pattern in the former case, or abandoning the child sans notification, to the proper authorities, such as an orphanage, hospital, religious organization, etc.

Parr (2013) offers a follow up critique to my claim that notification of an eviction does not constitute a positive obligation. Again, he sees in my analysis a self-contradiction. On the one hand, I claim, he avers, that the baby is like physical property. On the other, he maintains, that the unwanted fetus is a trespasser. I cannot be allowed to have it both ways, in his view.

My initial response to this sally is that Parr does not understand what an analogy is; but, as I fear to tread anywhere near his crotch, let me put the matter differently: Parr and I have a different understanding of the concept of analogy. In my view, an analogy is merely a story that attempts to explain, to clarify, an otherwise complicated issue. Thus, I used land homesteading in donut format so as to elucidate the concept of forestalling: not allowing other people to homestead the rights to something that a given person does not claim, or, no longer wants. I full well realize that land is physical property, and that babies are not. Both the homesteader of land in the form of a bagel, and the person who does not notify the authorities (orphanage, hospital, religious organization) are precluding others from accessing that which is no longer, or not ever, wanted, the land in one case, the baby in the other. I see no confusion here, no reason to change my attempt at explication, no error of disanalogy.

There is of course an important distinction between an adult trespasser and an infant one: the former can take care of himself, the latter is helpless without adult supervision. The question of notification simply does not arise in the first case, it is of the greatest moment in the second.

E. Duration

In this section I am castigated for changing my stance. It is hard to pin me down if I do this, Parr (2013) complains. I am "like ACME's pen ink — disappearing, and then reappearing. At one point (Block, 2011B) I aver "It matters not one whit how long a duration we are talking about." In another article (Block, 2011A) I assert the very opposite: "No, the amount of time is crucial." Interestingly, Part

14 Kinsella (2009A, 2009B) has written on this, not me.

(2013) gives the full context of the first of these statements, and none for the second. Could it be that the two are set in different contexts, and thus do not constitute a contradiction? For example, time is of the utmost importance on a hot day faced with a dripping ice cream cone, but of no moment whatsoever when it comes to justice (there are no statutes of limitation). There is no contradiction there. It is exceedingly difficult to determine if I am guilty of contradicting myself with no context supplied by Parr (2013).

F. Implicit contracts

Parr (2013) does make the not totally unreasonable point that under evictionism, "libertarianism is transformed into an ideology of corpses." This of course sounds horrible. But the number of deaths will be *less* than under pro-choice.[15] Of course there will be more than under pro-life, because the pro-life "gentleness" position compels unwilling mothers, including those whose fetuses are the result of rape,[16] to preserve life at the cost of their libertarian rights. And, this highly emotive charge of Parr's assumes that the pro-life forces, the "friends of babies" organizations, will not step up and adopt unwanted children to any significant degree. Under these conditions, yes, "out the ninth-story window with them," as Parr (2013) in effect charges. But, at least for the libertarian, there is no such thing as a right to life; that is a positive right. There is only the negative right not to be murdered. And Parr (2013) has not even come close to justifying any such claim.

I congratulate Parr on his very dramatic way of saying that trespassers must be evicted, if the owners of the property in question insist upon that; that comatose patients have no right to be attached, and stay attached for the rest of their lives, to the kidneys of their owners, against the will of the latter. If this means that "libertarianism is transformed into an ideology of corpses" let the opponents of libertarianism such as Parr[17] make the most of it. According to Parr (2013) "gentleness is *foundational* to libertarianism." It is not. That is a perversion of the libertarian philosophy.

G. Premise two

States Parr (2013) "gestation ensures that the fetus is in the process of departing the mother's premises…"[18] But, suppose this were not the case. Posit that the

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15 At one fell swoop, evictionism will preserve one third of all fetuses, those in their third trimester of development.

16 Real rape, here, not lacking in mens rea

17 I claim that Parr is anti liberty, but only on this one issue.

18 This is somewhat of a concession on Parr's part. He concedes, that is, that it is the mother's *premises.* E.g., that she is the *owner* of them, the womb.

human race operates like those Russian dolls that fit into one another. That is, the fetus stays inside the mother forever, or until she dies, and that her grandchild grows within the body of the fetus.[19] Would such a scenario shake up Parr's thesis? No longer could he assert "gestation ensures that the fetus is in the process of departing the mother's premises…" In contrast, the evictionist position would remain the same, impervious to this mental experiment. The point is, noting that the fetus is on his way out is evasive. It takes our eye off the ball. What is the ball? Why, private property rights. In any case, it takes a long nine month period for the trespassing fetus to be removed from someone else's property. I wonder if Parr would be willing to attach his kidney to a stringer through an umbilical chord, if the duration was only nine months.

Parr (2013, footnote deleted) opines: "in no way does the departurist requirement that the property owner 'withhold eviction for the duration of departure' necessitate a nine month unwanted occupation of the fetus in the mother's womb. A nine month occupation is *possible*, assuming that the pregnancy is unwanted from the outset. But the duration of departure might be as little as nine minutes, assuming that the pregnancy becomes unwanted only toward the very end of gestation."

I think my libertarian colleague gives the game away, here. Yes, of course, a nine minute duration is possible. But so is a "nine month occupation." Tell that to the victim of the rapist (who is drugged or hypnotized); tell that to the mother of the baby who is the result of rape; tell that to the person who must share a kidney with another against his will, for nine months. The essence of libertarianism is the NAP. "Departurism," e.g., the pro-life position of Parr, simply is not compatible with this philosophy.

III. CONCLUSION

In order to defend his "departurist" theory[20] Parr has to obliterate libertarianism. He converts it from a thesis based on the NAP and private property rights to one of being "gentle." Does he make an exception for rape? For the life of the mother? For incest? For malformed babies who cannot survive on their own outside the womb? In what direction does "gentleness" incline us on these issues? Perhaps this author will clarify these questions in his future writings. If he does make an

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19 I know, I know, this implies that boy babies too have fetuses growing within them. Don't ask me how they get inside, e.g., that the male of the species can become pregnant. Work with me here. I'm off on another one of my flights of fancy. Libertarian theorizing is fun, in part because we get to assume, arguendo, contrary to fact conditionals like this one. Nozick has no monopoly over this sort of thing.

20 Why the need for an entirely new name? Why the needless multiplication of verbiage? Parr's theory is indistinguishable from an already extant theory, pro-life.

exception in any or all of these cases, he reneges on his "gentleness." Or, he uses it arbitrarily. If not, if he would impose continued pregnancy upon those mothers unwilling to bear it, he is hardly being "gentle" to them.

In effect, Parr (2013) is an attempt to hijack libertarianism into something other than what it is. It is reminiscent of Chomsky's (Chomsky, 2011; Copple, 2010; Correa, 2007; Shaub, 2011) attempt to wrestle the nomenclature of libertarianism away from its present owners by characterizing his very, very different philosophy in this manner.

From a utilitarian point of view, subset "gentleness," evictionism is to be preferred to "departurism" (I place quote marks around the latter word since I do not see any difference between this view and the extreme pro-life position). Why? Because the "departurists" and pro lifers are now losing the intellectual and moral war. The pro-choice side seems to have won the battle for the hearts and minds of the populace, at least in all western democratic countries. Posit that it stays that way forever. Then there will be very little "gentleness" accorded to unwanted babies. However, if evictionism prevails, then, as medical technology improves, the fetus will be able to live at an earlier and earlier age, outside of the womb. That means that fewer and fewer of them will die as a result of evictionism. Eventually, perhaps, none of them will. Society cannot have a "gentler" policy than that. So, I call upon Parr to give up his departurism, his pro-life position. If he really favors "gentleness" he will embrace evictionism.

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